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Recent Decisions
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - RIGHT OF INSPECTION WITHOUT
A SEARCH WARRANT

In State ex rel. Eaton v. Price,1 relator was arrested for violation of an
ordinance of the city of Dayton which authorizes housing inspection for
the purpose of safeguarding the public health and safety, and directs that
an owner or occupant shall give a housing inspector free access at any
reasonable hour upon presentation of appropriate identification. The
specific charge leading to relator's arrest was his unlawful refusal to permit a housing inspector to enter his premises.2 On three separate occasions relator had turned the inspectors away, each time contending that
he was not bound to admit them unless they produced a search warrant.
On March 26, 1957, relator appeared in Dayton Municipal Court,
entered a plea of not guilty, and was incarcerated in city jail pending
trial. On the same day a writ of habeas corpus was sought in the court
of common pleas and on May 26, the writ was granted, the court having
determined that the ordinance was unconstitutional with respect to the
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to Article
One, Section Fourteen of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, each of
3
which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
An appeal was taken to the court of appeals, which court reversed the
judgment of the court of common pleas,4 and an appeal as of right was
taken to the Ohio Supreme Court.
1.

168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).

2.

DAYTON, OHIO CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES,

ORDINANCE

18099, 5

806-30 provides in part: "The Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed
to make inspections to determine the condition of dwellings, dwelling units, rooming
houses, rooming units and premises located within the city of Dayton in order that
he may perform his duty of safeguarding the health and safety of the occupants of
dwellings and of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections
and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is hereby authorized to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings, dwelling
units, rooming houses, rooming units, and premises. The owner or occupant of
every dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house, and rooming unit or the person in
charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such dwelling, dwelling
unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises at any reasonable hour for the
purpose of such inspection, examination and survey." Section 806-83 provides a penalty of not more than 200 dollars fine or not more than 30 days imprisonment, or
both for any violation of ORDINANCE 18099.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV is almost identical to OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 14 which
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be reached, and the person and things to be seized."
4. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 105 Ohio App. 376 (1958).
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The supreme court discarded quickly the contention that the ordinance was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States on the
authority of the court's previous decision in State v. Lindway,5 which
held that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and compulsory self-incrimination, are directed exclusively against the activities of
the federal government and have no application to the various states and
their agencies."
As to the alleged repugnancy of the Dayton ordinance to the Ohio
Constitution, the court was faced with a question of first impression in
Ohio. Relying upon the authority of cases decided in other jurisdictions
and upon public policy considerations, the court held that an ordinance
directing free access to a housing inspector without a search warrant for
the purpose of protecting the public health and welfare is not the authorization of an unreasonable search within the meaning of Article One, Section Fourteen of the Ohio Constitution.
In interpreting the search and seizure clause in the Ohio Constitution,
the court considered closely the only three cases decided in other jurisdictions which interpreted similar constitutional provisions.
The first of these cases was District of Columbia v. Little,6 wherein
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted the search and seizure clause of the Constitution of the United
States as prohibiting to a health inspector without a search warrant the
right of access to a private dwelling over the protest of the occupant. In
holding unconstitutional a District of Columbia ordinance providing for
such access, the majority opinion held broadly that no search was reasonable if not performed under authority of a search warrant except under
conditions of emergency. The dissenting opinion in the Little case, which
was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court, held that the search
and seizure clause was historically intended to apply only to attempts to
gain evidence for the purpose of criminal convictions, and that it was
never intended to apply to inspections for the protection of the public
health and welfare.
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 7 the Little case was
affirmed on other grounds, but the Ohio Supreme Court favored the opinion of the dissent, which stated that an inspection "of such a reasonable,
general, routine, accepted and important character, in protection of the
5.
6.

131 Ohio St 166 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).

7. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
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public health and safety" is lawful though performed without a search
8
warrant.
Following the Little case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Richards v. City of Columbia,9 upheld in an obiter dictum the validity of
that portion of a city ordinance relating to inspections without a search
warrant.
The third case the Ohio Supreme Court considered was Givner v.
State,10 a Maryland Court of Appeals case squarely in point which determined that an ordinance directing occupants to give inspectors free access
during daylight hours did not constitute the authorization of an unreasonable search. The Maryland court held that inspections of a routine
nature made at reasonable hours and for primarily protective, not punitive, purposes are reasonable searches.
Although the major part of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion is devoted to a discussion of supporting case precedent, the true basis for the
court's decision seems to be one of public policy. The policy at issue is
the right to personal privacy as against the protection of the health and
safety of the community. The court stated its determination of this issue
succinctly: "The right of a home owner to the inviolability of his 'castle'
should be subordinate to the general health and safety of the community
where he lives.""
In its reasoning, the Ohio Supreme Court considered briefly a situation not directly before it, but one more closely related in fact to traditional search and seizure cases. The court raised the question of whether
it would be unconstitutional to require access of an inspector without a
search warrant over the protest of the occupant where a first inspection
had disclosed a violation of an ordinance, and the sole purpose of the
present inspection is to determine whether compliance with the ordinance
has now been made when failure to comply requires the imposition of
criminal sanctions. Here, the purpose of the inspection is not the protection of the public health and safety, but rather, the collection of evidence to be used against the occupant in a criminal proceeding. It is
doubtful that any of the courts cited above would hold such an ordinance
to be constitutional as applied to this set of facts. Yet none of the municipal ordinances at issue before these courts distinguish between an inspection, the purpose of which is the protection of the public health and
8. Id. at 7.
9. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
10. 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
11. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 138, 151 N.E.2d 523, 532
(1958).

